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Antonio Damasio’s Theory of Emotions has deeply contributed to the understanding of the 
cognitive significance of affective states and of the relation between embodiment and cognition. 
Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that his account is inadequate from a phenomenological 
point of view. In the first place, I suggest that Damasio doesn’t provide a plausible analysis of the 
intentionality of emotions, ignoring both the intentional structure of feelings and the variety 
of objects they can be directed at. Secondly, I claim that by adopting a physiological approach 
to the study of emotions he can hardly account for their responsiveness to education and thus 
for the idea that it is possible to speak of responsibility also with regard to affective life. Besides, 
I suggest that Damasio doesn’t provide a plausible description of the way we become aware of 
other people’s affects, because he argues in favour of a separation between external behaviour 
and inner mental states.
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In this paper I will discuss the main intuitions of Antonio Damasio’s Theory of 
Emotions from a phenomenological perspective suggesting that, even though 
his approach has deeply contributed to the acknowledgement of the cognitive 
value of affects, the account he proposes is inadequate under various respects. 
In particular, I will argue that his theory misconceives the intentionality of 
emotions, their responsiveness to education and the intersubjective aspect of 
affective experience.
According to Damasio, emotions are particular states of the organism generally 
dependent upon the relation with the environment. They are regarded as 
homeostatic reactions, namely as regulatory processes which contribute to the 
survival and the biological wellbeing. Therefore, along with metabolism, the 
immune system, impulses and motivations (Damasio 2004), also emotions and 
feelings would help to reduce the negative effects of dangerous situations and 
to take advantage of favourable circumstances. Considered as the outcome of 
either pre-organized or learned response mechanisms, complex sets of neural 
and chemical reactions which give rise to various organic modifications, they 
have a fundamental role also in decision-making processes (Damasio 1995)1. 
Damasio maintains that affective states do not constitute an homogeneous 
category. In his opinion, anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness and surprise 
are “primary emotions” (1995), articulate neurobiological responses which, 
because of their being innate mechanisms, respond to stimuli and give rise to 
behaviours that are very uniform. However, he believes that also voluntary and 
non pre-determined cognitive processes could play a role in the development 
of emotions and argues that it is possible to identify emotional states to the 
emergence of which both evaluative judgments and personal experience are 
fundamental. Conditioning processes, in his view, would have a remarkable 
role also in the extension of affective sensitivity: on this basis, several aspects of 
personal and interpersonal experience would acquire affective significance, thus 
becoming the source of the so-called “secondary” or “social’ emotions” (1995). 














1 Indeed, in the author’s words: “Well-targeted and well-deployed emotion seems to be a 
support system without which the edifice of reason cannot operate properly. These results 
and their interpretation called into question the idea of dismissing emotion as a luxury or a 
nuisance or a mere evolutionary vestige. They also made it possible to view emotion as an 
embodiment of the logic of survival” (Damasio 2000, p. 42).
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Within this frame of reference, the number of potential inducers is indeed 
considered to be “infinite” (2000, p. 58)2.
Apart from the primary and the social ones, Damasio identifies a third fundamental 
category of affective states, namely “background emotions” (2000, pp. 52-53). 
He maintains that background emotions are responses provoked by internal 
conditions generated by diverse physiological processes, by the interaction of the 
organism with the environment or by both factors. The inducers of these emotions, 
then, would be mainly “internal” in character and they would result from a 
plurality of regulatory mechanisms operating simultaneously.  
Finally, it is important to note that, according to Damasio, emotional reactions are 
not necessarily felt by the subject. Emotions are consciously experienced only when 
a specific set of neural processes takes place and feelings of emotions3 consist in the 
perception of the bodily modifications which constitute emotional reactions4-5.
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2 Damasio argues that secondary emotions usually stem from cognitive evaluations, conscious 
mental representations directed at specific objects (1995). However, in his opinion, although these 
reactions differ from the basic ones, it is possible to claim that there exists a structural connection 
between primary and secondary emotions dependent on the fact that certain elements of primary 
emotions become constitutive parts of secondary emotions by undergoing only partial modifications. 
With reference to this point, for example, he maintains that contempt, which is deemed to be a 
typical secondary emotion, shares many features, and in particular facial expressions, with disgust, 
a primary emotion that, from the evolutionary point of view is connected with the avoidance of 
potentially dangerous food (Damasio 2004, p. 62).
3 Damasio uses the term “feeling” in order to designate every conscious perception of bodily states, 
emotional responses or other regulatory mechanisms.
4 Feelings, thus, are considered as the conscious perception of bodily changes and are regarded as 
dependent on the existence of the so-called “proto-self” (2000, p. 154), that is the articulate and constant 
representation of bodily states at the neural level. Indeed, in Damasio’s opinion, consciousness, even 
in the basic form of “core consciousness”, is grounded on the neurobiological capacity to collect and 
connect information regarding two specific elements: an external or internal object and the body itself. 
In this context, consciousness is viewed as the outcome of the capacity to have a neural representation 
of how a particular object has modified the bodily conditions and Damasio refers to the “sense of self” as 
a fundamental aspect of his conception (Damasio 2000, p. 7). From this point of view, by departing from 
the theories which consider consciousness and self-consciousness to be separate phenomena, he seems 
to suggest that the two should be identified, thus emphasizing the fact that experiences are always lived 
by the subject as his own experiences. “If ‘self-consciousness’ is taken to mean ‘consciousness with a 
sense of self’, then all human consciousness is necessarily covered by the term – there is just no other 
kind of consciousness as far as I can see” (2000, p. 19). 5 It is worth noting that, although in Damasio’s 
work the notion of feeling is usually employed to designate the conscious experience of an emotion, 
the author maintains that there is a difference also between “feeling” and “ knowing that we have a 
feeling” (2000, p. 36), thus suggesting that the presence of the neural and mental representations which 
constitute feelings does not necessarily entail that we are conscious of these events. Indeed he claims: 
“[...] I separate three stages of processing along a continuum: a state of emotion, which can be triggered 
and executed nonconsciously; a state of feeling, which can be represented nonconsciously; and a state 
of feeling made conscious, i.e. known to the organism having both emotion and feeling” (2000, p. 37). 
However, in his work “feeling” is often used to indicate the emotions we are conscious of and, for the 
sake of simplicity, this is the definition I refer to in this paper. 
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In Damasio’s account, emotions are of a fundamental importance to both short- 
and long- term decisions. The information they convey concern the biological 
value of particular stimuli and, as shown by the “somatic-marker hypothesis” 
(1995), they positively influence our choices and can give rise to actions which 
are beneficial under the physiological point of view. Damasio’s research, 
therefore, largely contributes to the rejection of the idea that there exists a 
radical opposition between emotion and cognition and between bodily processes 
and cognition.
First, since emotions are regulatory devices and the information they provide 
has a cardinal role in decision-making processes, they are attributed cognitive 
significance, thus making it impossible to keep on thinking that reason and 
affects are totally opposite phenomena. Secondly, by drawing attention to 
the role of both the body and the brain in the realization of emotional states, 
Damasio brings further evidence to the idea that mental functions are essentially 
modulated by the organism, namely that they are essentially embodied (Clark 
1997; Gallagher, Zahavi 2008; Merleau Ponty 1945; Varela et al. 1992)6.
 
Despite these important intuitions, it seems that Damasio’s Theory either 
ignores or misunderstands some essential characteristics of affective experience 
as an experience undergone from a first-person perspective.
In the first place, his approach doesn’t adequately account for the intentionality 
of emotions. Emotions seem to be directed at specific objects which define 
their character (De Sousa 1987; Scheler 1916) but, according to Damasio, feeling 
an emotion is equal to perceiving how the organism has been modified by 













6 Furthermore, as observed by Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), the hypothesis introduced with 
regard to the structure and constitution of the “sense of self” shares some important features 
with a phenomenological account of the topic. In the first place, it is important to observe that in 
Damasio’s account there seems to be no difference between consciousness and self-consciousness 
and this idea is typical also of phenomenological approaches. Indeed: “In contrast to higher-order 
theories, phenomenologists explicitly deny that the self-consciousness that is present the moment 
I consciously experience something is to be understood in terms of some kind of reflection, or 
introspection, or higher-order monitoring. It does not involve an additional mental state, but is 
rather to be understood as an intrinsic feature of the primary experience” (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008, pp. 
52-53). As outlined before, in order for core consciousness to emerge, at the neural level there should 
be a representation not only of the object we are conscious of, but also of the organism that by the 
interaction with that object is modified. The most basic form of consciousness, therefore, depends on 
the representation of the relation which exists between the proto-self and a particular object. 
Damasio, then, rejects the idea according to which the emergence of self-consciousness is dependent 
upon the mastery of particular uses of language (e.g. Baker 2000) and concepts and argues on 
the contrary that these capacities arise from a pre-verbal experience of the self. In accordance 
with investigations carried out in both Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Bermúdez 1998; 
Gallagher 2005), he believes that there is a form of self-awareness which is pre-linguistic in character 
and a further point of contact with the phenomenological perspective consists in the fact that both 
attribute to embodiment a central role in the constitution of this kind of consciousness.
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the interaction with a particular environmental condition or by an internal 
event. Therefore, these phenomena would consist in the perception of the 
modifications which have taken place in the body in response to a specific 
stimulus7. However, it is possible to wonder if this is a faithful account of 
emotional experience: is feeling an emotion identical with perceiving a 
particular bodily condition, possibly accompanied by the mental representation 
of the stimulus by which it has been elicited8?
Our ordinary experience deeply contradicts this idea. When feeling admiration 
or contempt for someone, for example, we experience not only a particular 
bodily state, but one or more qualities of the person we are interacting with. 
In particular, emotions seem to be about the different value properties which 
can define people, events or states of affairs (De Monticelli 2003; Mulligan 2010 
Scheler 1916). Goldie has drawn attention to the intentional aspect of affective 
states by claiming that, apart from bodily feelings, it is possible to speak of 
“feeling towards” (2000, p. 58), that is feelings directed at a variety of different 
objects9. Therefore, bodily feelings, rather than exhausting our emotional 
experience, would constitute only a particular form of it.
Furthermore, it is important to observe that in everyday emotional experience 
phenomenal properties do not seem to be separate from the intentional aspect of 
affective states. On the contrary, it is possible to claim that when we emotionally 
react to particular features of an object (for example, we experience fear in front 
of a ferocious dog), the “what it is like” (Nagel 1974) of our experience seems to be 
exactly the means by which the characteristics of the objects we are dealing with 
are appraised. As suggested by Goldie, emotions cannot be considered as neutral 
perceptions of particular properties accompanied by distinct bodily feelings 
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7 Damasio argues that emotions can take place also in absence of real bodily changes when an 
“as if body loop” process is realized at the neural level (2000, p. 281). This element, however, 
does not change the main claim of his theory, namely the idea that emotions are felt when 
there is a perception of bodily modifications, no matter whether these are real or not.
8 Furthermore, the distinction between “emotions” as mere bodily modifications and 
“feelings” as the conscious perception of those bodily modifications is in itself highly 
counterintuitive. Indeed, when speaking of “emotions” we usually refer to conscious, rather 
than unconscious, affective experiences and we do not usually consider “feeling” and 
“emotion” as two distinct phenomena.
9 As far as bodily feelings are concerned, however, Goldie argues that they are always 
directed at the body and that they can be about the world only by “borrowing” the 
intentionality of the “feelings towards” (Goldie 2000, p. 57). With reference to this point, I 
agree with Ratcliffe (2008, p. 35) in maintaining that the idea that bodily feelings cannot be 
world-directed is implausible from a phenomenological point of view, but I think that Goldie 
is right in claiming that not all intentional feelings are bodily feelings. By means of these 
experiences, indeed, we do not perceive only the conditions of the organism in a particular 
circumstance: rather, emotions and other affective reactions consist in the perception of 
different kinds of qualities which define various aspects of reality.
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(2002, p. 40). On the contrary, feelings themselves rather than merely coexisting 
with intentional states would have a peculiar intentional character, thus allowing 
for the rejection of an absolute distinction between phenomenal and intentional 
mental states (De Monticelli, Conni 2008). 
Moreover, we experience a wide variety of feelings and not all of them can be 
equated with the bodily sensations previously described. Social emotions such as 
pride, shame, embarassment or admiration, for example, do feel in specific and 
distinct ways, but these feelings, although they can be combined with particular 
bodily sensations, seem to be different, and, to a certain extent, autonomous states. 
In addition, as far as bodily feelings are concerned, it is possible to question the 
idea that they consist in the perception of the body as an object (Ratcliffe 2008). 
Indeed, from a phenomenological point of view, we can observe that, while in some 
cases we have an objectifying consciousness of our bodies, in most circumstances 
we are aware of them in a “pre-reflective” way (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008) and the 
background feelings described by Damasio usually convey an implicit awareness of 
the body as an experiencing subject rather than as an observed object. 
In Damasio’s perspective, despite the fact that affective intentionality is 
misunderstood, emotions are correctly seen as the basis of a rapid and implicit 
acknowledgement of the vital significance of a variety of situations. However, 
although this idea constitutes a fundamental step towards the recognition of the 
cognitive value of emotions, if not integrated with the consideration of the different 
kinds of significance emotions make us aware of, it still generates an incomplete 
account of first-personal affective phenomena. Thanks to emotions such as awe 
and contempt, pride and shame, we experience a series of qualities which seem not 
to be reducible to the biological value of the objects at issue. Things are worthy of 
admiration or blame, anger or disappointment because of a set of features which 
are independent of the fact that the circumstance is beneficial or detrimental to 
the organic equilibrium. Through the variety of affective states we have thus the 
possibility to experience qualities, such as the moral and aesthetic ones, that cannot 
be identified with the biological impact of the situation. Although he differentiates 
between primary and secondary emotions, Damasio seems to ignore this distinction. 
In his opinion, secondary emotions distinguish themselves from primary emotions by 
virtue of the nature – learned and not genetically pre-determined – of their inducers 
and the role played by conscious thought in their formation. It seems to me, however, 
that this distinction regards only the different processes which give rise to emotions 
and not their qualitative/intentional difference10. 
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10 Since, from a phenomenological point of view, it is not possible to consider 
qualitative aspects of emotions as separate from their intentional character, I am 
using the expression “qualitative/intentional” with reference to feelings which are 
directed at specific aspects of self, others and the world. 
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Since the stimuli of secondary emotions acquire their function of inducers 
because of their being associated with the stimuli of primary emotions, there is no 
substantial difference between the two phenomena. Indeed, like primary emotional 
states, secondary emotions are determined by the vital value of particular 
circumstances, and the fact that they can be accompanied by a conscious cognitive 
evaluation doesn’t change the evaluative dimension they refer to.
In my opinion, on the contrary, not only primary and secondary emotions differ 
from one another by virtue of their characteristic feeling (the “what it is like” 
of an emotion concerning the social world is not identical with the “what it is 
like” of non-social emotional reactions), but they are also directed at essentially 
different intentional objects11.
Furthermore, as far as secondary emotions are concerned, Damasio conceives 
of evaluation and emotion as two distinct processes: evaluative beliefs and 
judgements can have emotional effects but they are different from the bodily 
modifications which constitute emotions. However, from a phenomenological 
perspective it is possible to claim that affective states are evaluative processes 
and emotion themselves should be seen as evaluations by means of which a direct 
perception of axiological properties takes place (De Monticelli 2003; Scheler 1916). 
In Damasio’s account, affects are considered as completely passive phenomena: 
being regarded as neurobiological processes, emotions and the relative feelings 
can only be viewed as involuntary, automatic phenomena which, once elicited, 
can hardly be controlled. However, also this idea can be questioned from a 
phenomenological point of view. Feelings do not seem to be absolutely passive: 
although they are not completely under voluntary control, it would be wrong to 
maintain that we do not have any role in their constitution. On the contrary, we can 
exert a great influence on the development of our emotional life, for example by 
concentrating our attention on some qualities rather than others or by establishing 
priority relations among our emotional concerns.
If affective states are not passively undergone and we can exert an active role in 
their constitution, then it is plausible that, at least to a certain extent, feelings 
could be educated, thus allowing us to respond to particular things, people and 
states of affairs with increasingly appropriate emotional reactions. In everyday life 
we can say for example that “we try to overcome fear” or that “we have learnt to 





11 Moreover, there is no substantial phenomenological evidence in support of the idea 
that secondary emotions can be considered as particular combinations of elements 
characteristic of primary emotions (such as peculiar facial expressions) and other 
distinct components. On the contrary, emotions manifest themselves as unitary 
phenomena which differ in virtue of their intentional objects and qualitative character 
and therefore, even though they could share some features with one another, emotions 
such as contempt and disgust, should be seen as essentially different phenomena.
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get indignant” at something and sometimes, as time passes by, we become able to 
react in a more moderate way to the events which used to be the origin of negative 
emotions. It is by virtue of the role we feel we play in our affective education that 
we tend to deem people as at least partially responsible for the feelings they have or 
haven’t developed and from a phenomenological point of view, it is thus possible to 
maintain that affective sensitivity can be “extended” or “narrowed” (De Monticelli 
2003). As observed by Goldie:
emotions can be educated; in bringing up a child we use the child’s capability 
for emotional experience, and our own emotional responses, to educate him or 
her to recognize certain things as meriting a certain sort of emotional response. 
And, through this process of education, the child’s responses can come to be 
both appropriate and proportionate (Goldie 2000, p. 48).
Indeed, although some emotional reactions are completely involuntary, it is possible 
to take a position, even an affective one, towards our emotional responses, attributing 
or denying them a specific motivational role (Stein 1922). For example, when 
experiencing an emotion that we do not consider to be adequate, such as envy of a 
friend’s success, we can prevent this state from provoking other negative emotions, 
trying to leave the affective “landscape” open to other positive emotions, such as joy 
or admiration for the friend’s abilities. If emotional states were totally passive, there 
wouldn’t be the possibility to go through this affective modulation and evolution.
However, it is possible to claim that, in the cases described by Damasio, an affective 
development concerning secondary emotions can take place. Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that in his account, at the level under consideration, it is a 
particular cognitive process that determines a set of physiological reactions, while, 
along with De Monticelli (2003) I suggest that, from a phenomenological point of 
view, a specific affective, rather than cognitive, maturation takes place. Beside 
judgements, also emotions can become more appropriate, thus resulting in our 
being able to respond to aspects of reality which were previously neutral from the 
affective point of view or to experience more adequate emotional reactions.
Finally, I would like to examine an aspect of Damasio’s theory which I consider of a 
primary importance for the intersubjective status of emotions. By defining emotions 
as complex sets of bodily reactions to specific environmental or internal conditions, 
he argues that these states can be the object of experimental observation, that is they 
can be publicly examined and measured from a third-person perspective. Feelings, on 
the other hand, would consist in the subject’s conscious perception of the emotion, 
namely a first-person experience which, in Damasio’s opinion, is private and can be 
acknowledged only by the subject himself. Therefore, he maintains that only the 
bodily modifications that constitute the emotion are directly observable while the 
presence of feelings should be deduced from verbal reports and by means of analogies 
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF ANTONIO DAMASIO’S THEORY OF EMOTIONS
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with the observer’s own experience. In his opinion, then, there would be a radical 
separation between what is public and accessible from a third-person perspective and 
what is private and accessible only from a first-person perspective.
The capacity to understand the experience of others, that is the capacity to attribute 
mental states, is a primary philosophical issue and the approach adopted by Damasio 
with reference to this point is still characterized by some “cartesian” elements. In his 
view (2000), indeed, we directly experience only the body of other people, namely the 
external manifestations and the bodily changes that can be scientifically investigated. 
The subjective component, the feeling itself, is completely hidden and its existence 
is to be inferred on the basis of some relevant circumstances. Therefore, although 
central to Damasio’s position is the acknowledgment of the relation which exists 
between mental and bodily phenomena, as far as their manifestation is concerned, 
these phenomena are considered as radically separate12.
I believe, however, that the author’s account is once again implausible in light of the 
structure of our first-person experience. In interpersonal relations, indeed, we do not 
have an exclusively indirect access to the emotional states of other people: on the 
contrary, we are able to perceive them directly. As suggested by Scheler, we do not 
perceive the blushing of a face as a mere cutaneous reaction that only subsequently, 
thanks to the subject’s reports and the comprehension of the circumstances, can 
be associated with a particular emotion. Rather, in the blushing we immediately 
perceive shame as in a particular grimace we can perceive anger. The felt emotion 
and its expression should thus be considered as a unitary phenomenon rather than 
two distinct elements (Buck 1993; Scheler 1923). Cheerfulness and sadness, anger 
and tenderness are manifested by characteristic gestures and expressions and these 
phenomena, rather than being mere signs or symptoms, are an integral part of the 
affective state itself13. Thanks to these gestures and expressions, we directly perceive 
others’ emotional reactions, namely we have an immediate access to their lived 
experience. The radical separation between emotion and feeling, which mirrors 
the separation between behaviour and consciousness, seems then inappropriate to 
account for the structure of our interpersonal relations and gives rise to unconvincing 
explanations of how we become conscious of the mental states of others.
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12 “It is through feelings, which are inwardly directed and private, that emotions, which are 
outwardly directed and public, begin their impact on the mind […]” (Damasio 2000, p. 36).
13 This idea is not at odds with the acknowledgement of the importance of feelings in affective 
experience. As observed by Goldie: “One can easily allow the importance of feelings in emotion 
and emotional experience whilst at the same time responding to and defusing an unnecessary 
misunderstanding about the epistemology of others’ emotions – a misunderstanding which, to 
summarize, goes something like this: an emotion is what one feels (false); only he can experience 
what he is feeling (true); so I cannot know what emotion he is feeling (false); all I can grasp are the 
expressions of the emotion he is feeling and these are only symptoms of the thing itself (false)” 
(Goldie 2000, pp. 184-185).
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